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The majority's position is perhaps based on the conviction that the
Court should not engage in a case-by-case analysis when an executive
body has .been delegated that task. By formulating a more realistic
standard, or by placing some real limitations on the executive discre-
tion, they would have accomplished the same result without denying
the Court's own authority. The Attorney General, after this decision,
is free to pursue virtually any policy he chooses, and can expect neither
guidelines nor criticism from the Court.
SUSAN GINSBERG
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DuE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT
LIMITS BE PLACED ON PSYCHIATRIC CONFINEMENT COMMENSURATE WITH
THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS EMPLOYED IN OBTAINING THAT CON-
FINEMENT.
We'd like to know
A little bit about you
For our files.
We'd like to help you learn
To help yourself.
Look around you. All you see
Are sympathetic eyes.
Stroll around the grounds
Until you feel at home.
Paul Simon, "Mrs. Robinson"
In July 1966, Edward McNeil was sentenced to five years in a
Maryland prison after having been convicted on two charges of as-
sault. Prior to his actual imprisonment, the trial judge made an
ex parte determination that there was reasonable cause to suspect
that McNeil was a defective delinquent.1 As a result, he was com-
Smith, Jr., Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department
of State, Feb. 7, 1972, in Developments in the Laz--The National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 HAav. L. REv. 1153 n.97. It may be anticipated that any further
changes in policy will be unreviewable, regardless of their effect on first amendment
rights.
1. A defective delinquent is defined as:
an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial
or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who
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mitted to Maryland's Patuxent Institution for psychiatric evalua-
tion, under the provisions of the Defective Delinquents Law.2 On
at least fifteen separate occasions, over the next six years, McNeil
refused to cooperate with the examining psychiatrists, claiming a
fifth amendment right to remain silent.3 Upon conclusion of his crim-
inal sentence, McNeil petitioned for his release on the ground that
the State's power to hold him had expired. The trial court held that
the Maryland law permitted the State to continue McNeil's confine-
ment until the psychiatric examination was completed "without regard
to whether or not [his] criminal sentence ... has expired."4 After the
Maryland Court of Appeals denied appellant leave to appeal, his pe-
tition for certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.
Held: due process requires that the psychiatric confinement of an
individual not be extended beyond limits commensurate with the pro-
cedural safeguards employed in obtaining or extending that confine-
ment. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
The involuntary commitment of persons with mental health prob-
lems is usually justified by one of two concepts: parens patriae or the
state's police power.5 The doctrine of parens patriae permits confine-
ment by the state of those persons who, because of a mental disability,
are unable to care for themselves.6 A good example of this procedure
embodied in legislation is contained in New York's newly revised Men-
tal Hygiene Law, which defines a person "in need of involuntary care
and treatment" as one who "has a mental illness for which care and
treatment as a patient in a hospital is essential to such person's welfare
and whose judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand
the need for such care and treatment." 7 Forty-three American jurisdic-
is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance,
or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require
such confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably
safe for society to terminate the confinement and treatment.
Defective Delinquents Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1971).
2. Id. § 1 et seq. (1971).
3. Brief for Petitioner at 10-12, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U.S. 245 (1972).
4. Defective Delinquents Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6(e) (1971).
5. R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 6 (1968);
Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 28, 32 (1960); Taylor, A Critical Look into the Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment Procedure, 10 WASnBURN L.J. 237, 239-40 (1971).
6. Taylor, supra note 5, at 239.
7. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 31.01 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (effective Jan. 1,
1973).
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tions provide some form of judicially supervised involuntary hospitali-
zation.8 In eighteen of these, the need for care and treatment and the
state's police power-the power of the sovereign to protect the state
from breaches of the peace-are alternate grounds for such hospitaliza-
tion.9 In six jurisdictions, the sole ground for hospitalization is the
need for care and treatment, while in nine others the only justifica-
tion is the State's police power.10 The statutes of the remaining ten
jurisdictions tend to speak in broad generalities about "insanity,"
"feeblemindedness" and "mental illness.""1 An extreme example of this
category was found in the Massachusetts law that, until it was recently
revised, authorized the involuntary commitment of any person who is
"likely to conduct himself in a manner which clearly violates the estab-
lished laws, ordinances, conventions or morals of the community."'
2
In addition to these involuntary commitment statutes, twenty-four
jurisdictions also have laws dealing specifically with psychopaths-
primarily sexual psychopaths.'3 Such laws are often the result of a pub-
lic uproar over a brutal sex crime, and represent attempts to protect
the public from those individuals with proclivities toward sex offenses.' 4
The aim of these statutes is twofold: to protect society, which is the
primary goal, and to provide the psychopath with treatment.'8
One of the recurring themes whenever involuntary commitment is
discussed is the lack of due process involved in the commitment proce-
dures.' One recent study by the American Bar Foundation found that
8. S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 36 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BRAKEL & ROCK].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 39.
12. [1955] Mass. Laws ch. 637, § 1, as amended, MAsS. GEN. LAws ch. 123, § 1
et seq. (effective July 1, 1971). The amendment eliminated the definition of "mentally
ill" entirely and now conditions involuntary commitment upon the finding of a "likeli-
hood of serious harm" either to the patient himself or to others. The old definition is
quoted only to show the extreme position taken by Massachusetts until last year.
13. BRAKEL & ROCK 362-65. Maryland's Defective Delinquents Law falls in this
category. Only Connecticut, Maryland and Washington have definitions of psychopaths
in their statutes that do not involve sex or sex crimes. Id.
14. Id. at 341.
15. Id. at 343. As yet, however, no truly effective method of treatment is recognized
for the psychopathic personality and, although the statutes profess to have treatment as
a goal, treatment is often ineffectual. Id. at 352. See J. COLEMDAN, ABNORMrAL PSY-
CHOLOGY AND MODERRN LIFE 375 (4th ed. 1972).
16. E.g., Kittrie, supra note 5, at 39-50; Note, Mental Illness and Due Process:
Involuntary Commitment in New York, 16 N.Y.L.F. 165 (1970).
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the rights of persons committed as mentally ill were not adequately
protected by the statutes.17 Thirty-one states presently allow involun-
tary hospitalization solely on the basis of certificates signed by one or
two physicians,' 8 a procedure that is the result of pressure from the
psychiatric community to dejudicialize commitment proceedings.19
Although this type of commitment is accomplished without a hearing,
one is generally available if the patient later requests it. Even when
such a hearing is held, however, due process is, in the main, illusory,
since the courts cut corners under medical pressure and often become
mere "rubber stamps" for psychiatric opinion. 20 For example, forty-
three of fifty-one jurisdictions have statutory provisions granting an
individual a right to retained counsel at this hearing, but only twenty-
three make a court-appointed attorney mandatory if the patient does
not have his own.2' In light of the fact that a person can be involun-
tarily committed for an indefinite period in twenty-four states, 22 this
lack of due process may seem surprising. Although these statutes have
been attacked, the challenges have met with little success.2
Due process and other constitutional challenges to these statutes
are usually rebutted by the State's arguing that the proceedings are
civil, rather than criminal, in nature and that their purpose is to
treat rather than punish.24 The judicial origins of this distinction are
obscure, but one of the earliest reported recognitions came in 1881 from
the Supreme Court of Iowa.25 There, a county sought to recover from
a decedent's estate the cost incurred in maintaining him in a mental
hospital. The executor argued that the adjudication of lunacy with-
out notice, confrontation, a right to counsel, or a speedy and public
jury trial, violated the provision of the Iowa constitution requiring
due process "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the
life, or liberty of an individual ... ,"26 However, the court construed
17. BRAXEL & ROCK. 171.
18. See id. at 57-58, 60.
19. Id. at 60.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 125-27.
22. See id. at 91-95. Fourteen of those twenty-four jurisdictions also make a
court-appointed lawyer mandatory at commitment proceedings. Id. at 125-27.
23. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 354 (1952).
24. Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87, 92-93 (1967).
25. County of Black Hawk v. Springer, 58 Iowa 417, 10 N.W. 791 (1881).
26. IowA CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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this provision to apply only to criminal prosecutions, where punish-
ment is imposed through fine or imprisonment.27 The court stated that
[t]he inquest of lunacy... is in no sense a criminal proceeding. The
restraint of an insane person is not designed as punishment for any
act done. The insane are by the law taken into the care and custody
of the state for treatment for their unfortunate infirmity.28
In effect, parens patriae was invoked to validate the state's confine-
ment of the mentally ill decedent without due process. A few years
later, the same court reaffirmed its holding in a case where an asylum
inmate sought release through a writ of habeas corpus.2 Thus, the
court was not only willing to employ this distinction to compel an
estate to pay a sum of money, but also to continue the confinement of
an individual. In the 1940's and early 1950's, newly enacted sexual
psychopath laws came under increasing attack and the courts revived
the civil-criminal dichotomy to defend them. 0 Perhaps the most fre-
quently cited case from this period came from the Supreme Court of
Michigan, where the constitutionality of that state's sexual psychopath
law was upheld on the ground that the proceedings were "not cir-
cumscribed by the constitutional and statutory limitations surround-
ing a person accused of, or tried for, a crime."3' Today the distinction
between civil and criminal proceedings persists as a device by which
courts permit involuntary commitment without adequate procedural
safeguards.
32
Precedent has not been the sole defense of the civil characteriza-
tion of commitment proceedings. The underlying reasons for this
characterization are often explained. As one court put it:
The purpose of a criminal proceeding is to punish. But this Act is but
a civil inquiry to determine a status. It is curative and remedial in
nature instead of punitive. One of its purposes is the treatment and
27. 58 Iowa at 417, 10 N.W. at 791.
28. Id. at 417-18, 10 N.W. at 791-92.
29. In re Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991 (1891).
30. See, e.g., In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 223 P.2d 159 (1951); State
ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950); In re Moulton, 96
N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26 (1950); In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652, cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 767 (1946); People v. Sims, 382 I11. 472, 47 N.E.2d 703 (1943);
People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
31. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 603, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26 (1942), citing In re
Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991 (1891).
32. E.g., Rose v. Haugh, 259 Iowa 1344, 147 N.W.2d 865 (1967); In re Anony-
mous, 62 Misc. 2d 578, 309 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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cure of a present and existing mental disorder.... The public policy
of the State . . . is to treat and cure such persons, not to punish
them .... [They] are merely made subject to restraint and treatment
because of their condition and their acts .. .to prevent [them] from
being punished for crimes they commit during the period of this men-
tal ailment.
33
Once it is found that the statute's aims are remedial, rather than puni-
tive, the "civil" label is applied.
The refusal to require strict due process safeguards in commit-
ment proceedings has been a result of the social and historical frame-
work within which the decisions have been made. The history of the
treatment of the mentally disabled has had a considerable impact on
society's view of mental health problems and this, in turn, has been
reflected in judicial opinion. The earliest theories of mental illness,
formulated by Hippocrates and extended by Galen, postulated that
an imbalance in the four body humors-blood, phlegm, yellow and
black bile-caused aberrations of the mind.8 4 By the Middle Ages, how-
ever, medicine had turned to superstition, demonology and sorcery.
With the exception of a few learned men, it was generally believed
that the mentally ill were possessed by spirits.35 This belief may have
reached its peak in the fifteenth century with the publication, by two
Dominican inquisitors, of Malleus Maleficarum [The Hammer of
Witches]. Two centuries of continuous and vigorous witch-hunting
followed this definitive essay on the identification and punishment of
witches.30 By the seventeenth century, madmen were being placed in
hospitals instead of being burned as witches, thus initiating "[t]he
great confinement of the insane. '3 7 By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, a movement had begun to improve conditions in these hos-
pitals-conditions which had deteriorated to such an extent that they
often rivaled the worst penal institutions.38 The reform movement
33. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253, 232 S.W.2d 897, 900
(1950).
34. G. KiSxER, THE DISORGANIZED PERSONALITY 37-38 (1964).
35. Id. at 39-41.
36. T. SZASZ, THE MANuFACTURE OF MADNESS 7 (1970).
37. Id. at 13, quoting M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 39 (1961).
38. G. KIsRER, supra note 34, at 45-49.
I have seen them coarsely fed, deprived of fresh air, or water to quench their
thirst .... I have seen them in squalid, stinking little hovels, without air or
light, chained in caves where wild beasts would not have been confined....
There they remain to waste away in their own filth under the weight of chains
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in the United States found its most vigorous proponent in Dorothea
Dix, who in 1841 began her forty-year campaign in aid of the men-
tally ill. Miss Dix labored to transfer the insane out of the jails and alms-
houses and into hospitals where it was thought most could be cured.""
It was largely through her efforts that the American public first be-
came aware of mental illness as a medical phenomenon, and of the prob-
lems of the mentally ill.40 One other influence in this field in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century that must be mentioned, if
only in passing, is the contribution of Sigmund Freud.41 It was his
work, to a great extent, that brought psychology to its full maturity
by developing the most comprehensive personality theory conceived
until that time.4 The position taken by the judiciary in the United
States reflected the public awareness that hospitalization was necessary
to help the mentally ill. This decriminalized their confinement and
labeled it treatment. As evidence of their compassion for these un-
fortunate people, the courts, fully believing a cure was possible, en-
dorsed a state policy which involuntarily confined the mentally ill
for their own good (parens patriae). The revolutionary theories of
Freud and others that were in the process of development at that time
reinforced this idea, and allowed the judges to believe that they were
benefiting the individual.
This, then, was the state of the law at the turn of the century,
and it remained relatively unchanged until about twenty years ago.
Since civil commitment was considered to be for the individual's wel-
fare, the judicial attitude was that procedural safeguards need not be
as strict as in purely criminal proceedings where the object was more
punitive. The recent trend, however, is toward requiring the safe-
guards of a criminal trial, at least in sexual psychopath proceedings,
an area that most closely resembles the criminal law.48 The comparison
of the confinement of the sexual psychopath to criminal penal sanc-
which lacerate their bodies. Their faces are pale and emaciated; they await
only the moment which will end their misery and conceal our disgrace.
Id. at 45, quoting from J. ESQUIRoL, DES MALADIES MENTALES (1838).
39. G. KiSKER, supra note 34, at 51. "No other individual did more in the nine-
teenth century to advance the idea of communal responsibility for the welfare of the
mentally disabled." BRAKEL & RocK 8.
40. G. K.ISKER, supra note 34, at 52.
41. Freud's THE NEURO-PSYcHOSES OF DEFENCE was published in 1894, THE
INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS in 1900, and THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
in 1901. T SZASZ, supra note 36, at 356-57.'
42. G. KiSKER, supra note 34, at 64-65.
43. BRAKEL & RocKs 345, 356-57; see Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952).
514
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tions is facilitated by some of the characteristics of psychopath legisla-
tion. Generally, such laws are not applicable to an individual unless
he has been charged with a violation of some criminal law (particu-
larly sex offenses).44 Current psychiatric opinion defines as psycho-
pathic, or antisocial, those "individuals who are basically unsocialized
and whose behavior pattern brings them repeatedly into conflict with
society."45 Thus, diagnosis as a psychopath could cause an individual
to be incarcerated for prior unrecorded and unconfirmed acts without
an opportunity to defend himself. 46 The original rationale for calling
the proceedings by which a person is involuntarily committed "civil"
is substantially weakened if that person is confined on the basis of a past
history of antisocial or criminal behavior for an indefinite term with-
out any real prospect of effective treatment.4 7 In such a case, the courts
should find it more difficult to argue that the purpose of the statute
"is curative and remedial in nature instead of punitive" and that the
''public policy of the State ... is to treat and cure such persons .... ,48
The Supreme Court in McNeil looked at the practicalities of
petitioner's confinement and saw a "stark and simple claim" 49 that
the State was holding him beyond his sentence without legal justifica-
tion. The State of Maryland raised three major arguments inl defense
of the continued confinement of McNeil. One reason was based on a
syllogism that most individuals who do not cooperate with the authori-
ties when committed for observation are in fact "defective delinquents";
McNeil did not cooperate; therefore, McNeil is a defective delin-
44. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 435 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
39-19-1 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-239(2) (1958); ILL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 105-3 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3402 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 225A.1 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6(a) (1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.710
(1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-A:2 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-3
(Supp. 1971); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.24 (Baldwin 1964); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-1301 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-49-1 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 71.06.020 (1962).
45. THE COMMITTEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN
PsYcniATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
ORDERS 43 (2d ed. 1968). This definition is listed under the heading, "Personality Dis-
orders," which are recognized as life-long patterns of behavior. Id. at 41.
46. BRAKEL & ROCK 354.
47, -See id. at 352.
48. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253, 232 S.W.2d 897, 900 (1950).
49. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 248 (1972). This
claim was distinguished by the Court from the more complex claims raised in the com-
panion case to McNeil, Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972),
in which the entire Defective Delinquents Law was challenged by inmates who had *been
adjudged defective delinquents.
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quent and should be confined. 50 A second rationale analogized ap-
pellant's confinement to civil contempt on the ground that McNeil's
refusal to cooperate in itself justified imprisonment.51 A final reason
was the orthodox idea that commitment had not been imposed as a
criminal sanction, but only for observation purposes; thus the proce-
dural safeguards of a final determination of defective delinquency
were not required.5 2 The Court disposed of the first two arguments
rather summarily. The majority said that if Patuxent could infer that
McNeil was a defective delinquent from his lack of cooperation, then
he had not prevented the Institution from evaluating him and they
should "have long been ready to make their report to the Court."5 3 The
contempt analogy was rejected on the ground that there had been no
hearing to determine whether McNeil's conduct was in fact contemptu-
ous. 54 In response to the State's third argument, the Court examined
the realities of the situation and observed a confinement that had al-
ready lasted six years, with no indication when, or if, it would ever
end. The Court did not deny the authority of the State to confine
McNeil for an indefinite term, but held that procedural "safeguards
commensurate with a long-term commitment" were prerequisites to
such action. 5  If lesser safeguards are appropriate because the commit-
ment is only intended to be of short duration, then the length of the
confinement must in fact be strictly limited.5 6 Although the Court was
unwilling to set specific limits, it did indicate that the statutory limit
of six months set in the Defective Delinquents Law5 7 for the initial
evaluation period was "a useful benchmark," even though the state
courts permitted extensions. 58 Since Maryland did not have the power
to confine McNeil indefinitely without a judicial determination that the
confinement was warranted, he was entitled to be released.59
50. 407 U.S. at 251.
51. Id. at 250.
52. Id. at 249.
53. Id. at 252.
54. Id. at 251.
55. Id. at 249.
56. Id. at 249-50.
57.
[The examining officials at Patuxent] shall state their findings ... not later
than six months from the date said person was received in the Institution for
examination, or three months, before the expiration of his sentence, whichever
first occurs.
Defective Delinquents Law, MD. CODE ANN. art; 31B, § 7(a) (Supp. 1972).
58. 407 U.S. at 250.
59. Id. at 252.
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In support of this holding, the Court cited a recent case in which a
mentally defective deaf-mute had been charged with robbery but found
to be incompetent to stand trial.60 He was then involuntarily com-
mitted "until such time as [the] Department [of Mental Health] should
certify to the court that 'the defendant is sane.'"61 The Court found
that the likelihood of improvement in his condition was so remote that
his commitment amounted to life imprisonment and that, without the
pending criminal charges, the state would be required to adhere to the
higher standards of due process required in the commitment of all
other mentally ill citizens. Since the nature of the proceeding alone
permitted a lesser standard of procedural safeguards, the defendant
had been denied equal protection of the law under the fourteenth
amendment, even though the result would have been identical.6 2 The
majority went on to hold that, "[a]t the least, due process requires that
the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed. '6 3
The one major argument which McNeil raised and the Court
chose not to consider was his claim that the fifth amendment gave him
the right not to cooperate.64 In his concurring opinion, however, Mr.
Justice Douglas indicated that he believed the fifth amendment gave
petitioner this right, not only because some of the questioning took
place while his appeal on the assault convictions was still pending, but
also because the questioning involved many other prior antisocial or
criminal acts.65 One final point that was raised by McNeil and totally
ignored by the majority was that he should have been afforded sub-
stantial due process safeguards because the proceedings by which he
was to be committed were analogous to proceedings involving juve-
niles. 6 Mr. Justice Douglas agreed that such an argument was applicable
here since juvenile delinquency proceedings result in similar depriva-
tions of liberty and consequences to fifth amendment freedoms.67
The McNeil opinion is as important for what it does not say as
for what it expressly holds. Significantly, the Court refrains from any
60. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
61. Id. at 719.
62. Id. at 729-30.
63. Id. at 738.
64. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972).
65. Id. at 254-57.
66. Brief for Petitioner at 50, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S.
245 (1972), citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. 407 U.S. at 257.
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discussion of the civil-criminal distinction in the nature of the pro-
ceedings.6 It would be difficult to argue that this omission by the Court
indicates the demise of this distinction. Nevertheless, such a realistic
approach would be entirely in accord with previous positions of the
Court. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 9 drawing upon concepts enunciated by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath,7 0 the Court announced that "[t]he extent to which proce-
dural due process must be afforded ... is influenced by the extent
to which [the individual] may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss . ... "71 Thus, a concept originally conceived by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter to encompass only the right to be heard was extended to
the area of due process generally. The question remains whether com-
mitment as a defective delinquent, or as a sexual psychopath, consti-
tutes a "grievous loss." It is certainly arguable that confinement for an
indefinite term, perhaps for life, in the absence of adequate treatment
72
is a "grievous" loss of liberty. As C. S. Lewis stated:
To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my
liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modem
psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern
of "normality" hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never
professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end until
either my captors have succeeded or I grown wise enough to cheat
them with apparent success-who cares whether this is called Punish-
ment or not.
78
This loss of liberty is ostensibly justified by the need of society to con-
fine the mentally ill for their own good or the good of the commu-
nity. Even if one concedes that the societal need is great enough to
68. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, refers to the distinction merely
to say that it is of no importance to a claim under the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment. Id. at 257. This omission may be all the more significant in light of
the fact that the State, in its brief, frequently referred to the distinction and based
several of its arguments on the fact that defective delinquency proceedings were civil
in nature. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 32, 33, 38, 39, 41, 55, 58, 59, 67, 68, 80,
82, 84, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
70. 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (concurring opinion).
71. 397 U.S. at 262-63, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. The Maryland statute provides for "such confinement and treatment, when
appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe... to terminate the confinement and treat-
ment." Defective Delinquents Law, MI. CODE ANN. art. 31B, § 5 (1971). Presumably,
if there is no treatment, then it may never be safe to end the confinement.
73. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RnS JUDImATAE 224, 227
(1953).
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justify a deprivation of personal liberty, that liberty is still a precious
enough possession to command adequate due process safeguards before
it may be taken away. If the McNeil decision is a bellwether, the fact
that the confinement may not be punitive will be irrelevant.
The opposing position, taken by the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation and the National Association for Mental Health, favors "a
simple commitment procedure entailing an application to the hospital
by a close relative or friend, and a certification by two qualified physi-
cians that they have examined the subject and found him to be men-
tally ill."74 They criticize the judicial procedures already in use for
involuntary commitment and clearly would not support any increased
legal controls.7
5
One psychiatrist who would not agree with this position is
Thomas Szasz, who is totally opposed to involuntary commitment for
psychiatric treatment.7 6 In fact, it is his contention that there is no
such thing as "mental illness," at least as conceived by modem psy-
chiatrists.77 The human body can be physically ill, but when one speaks
of a "sick mind," one is Using a metaphor, as when one speaks of a
"sick economy" or a "sick joke."78 Szasz sees modern Institutional Psy-
chiatry as merely a means of protecting society's dominant ethic, a
function served by the Inquisition between the fifteenth and seven-
teenth centuries7 9 People who deviated from socially accepted norms
of behavior were described by the authors of Malleus Maleficarum as
witches, while today the American Psychiatric Association's Manual
of Mental Disordersso describes them as mentally ill.s1 Thus, people are
stigmatized as mentally ill and offered as "psychiatric scapegoats" for
74. BRAICEL & ROCx 59-60, quoting from a statement made in behalf of the two
associations before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in March, 1961,
reported in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL
HEALTH JOINT INFORMATION SERVICE, PSYCHIATRIC POINTS OF VIEW REGARDING LAWS
AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING MEDICAL TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1962).
75. BRAKEL & ROCK 60. See also text accompanying notes 21, 22 supra.
76.
If psychiatrists really wanted these things, all they would have to do is to
unlock the doors of mental hospitals, abolish commitment, and treat only those
persons who, like in nonpsychiatric hospitals, want to be treated. This is
exactly what I have been advocating for the past fifteen years.
T. SZASZ, supra note 36, at 52.
77. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 113 (1960).
78. Szasz, A Psychiatrist Views Mental Health Legislation, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 224,
226 (1970).
79. T. SZASZ, supra note 36, at 58-59.
80. See supra note 45.
81. T. SzASz, supra note 36, at 28-41.
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society's illS. 82 Once this is done, society, through its doctors, can strip
them of their civil rights and privileges. By giving the doctors the
authority to determine who will be incarcerated and when they will
be released, too much judicial power is placed in their hands88 What
ultimately evolves from this exercise of judicial power by doctors is,
what Szasz calls, the Therapeutic State.8 4 The ultimate Therapeutic
State today is the Soviet Union, where patients are coerced into treat-
ment, and the politically embarrassing individual is treated as men-
tally ill.85
One need not, however, accept the extreme position of Szasz to
conclude that involuntary "civil" commitment should be surrounded
by strict procedural safeguards. Perhaps the greatest stumbling block
to providing these safeguards is the distinction between civil and crim-
inal confinement. McNeil can hardly be considered a definite holding
by the Supreme Court that this distinction is dead. However, there
was no mention of the "civil" nature of Maryland's Defective Delin-
quents Law, nor was there a need to mention it. Any time a person
faces the possible loss of his liberty for an indefinite period, the proce-
dures whereby this is accomplished should allow for the least amount
of error and provide him with the most protection possible. The loss
of one's personal liberty for what may be a lifetime is indeed a
"grievous loss" and, in that context, the civil-criminal dichotomy is
rendered meaningless.
CHRISTOPHER B. AsHTON
82. Id. at 209.
83. See Szasz, Justice in the Therapeutic State, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 20 (1969).
84. Id.
85. T. SZASZ, supra note 36, at 217-18.
